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This Article examines the role that tradition and traditionalism have long
played and continue to play in the United States Supreme Court's and
federal courts of appeals' interpretation and application of the Due Process
Clauses of the United States Constitution, and the judicial determination
that a claimed right is or is not a fundamental right that cannot be abridged
absent a compelling state interest. Traditionalism-understood as a method
of constitutional interpretation and the judicial recognition of only those
rights deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, or implicit in the
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concept of ordered liberty-has been touted as an objective approach that
reaches legal conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable evidence.
On that view, traditionalism constrains judicial discretion, and impedes the
introduction of a judge's subjective political and moral judgments into the
due process calculus and fundamental rights determination. This Article
contests that view and argues that traditionalism cloaks subjective and
discretionary judging in the garb of a purportedly objective and discretion-
limiting methodology. As argued herein, traditionalism is discretionary in
at least three respects: (1) a judge selects traditionalism over and instead of
other interpretive methodologies and jurisprudential approaches; (2) a
traditionalist judge is free to frame the legal inquiry and to define the level
of generality at which a claimed right is characterized; and (3) a
traditionalist judge discretionarily determines the time frame within which
she will look for evidence and confirmation that a claimed fundamental
right did or did not-does or does not-exist. These decision points,
necessarily involving a judge's discretion and subjective viewpoints and
value judgments, belie the posited neutrality and objectivity of
traditionalism. Recognition of this reality is essential to an informed
understanding of the mechanics of the substantive due process inquiry.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution provide that the federal
and state governments shall not deprive persons of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.1 More than a constitutional man-
date of procedural due process and "a guarantee of fair procedure in con-
nection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property," 2 it is now well
settled that a "substantive component" of the clauses (the Due Substance
Clauses) 3 also protects "individual liberty against 'certain government ac-
tions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them." 4 Thus, substantive due process review of laws and governmental
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (1791) ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .").
2. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
3. See Charles L. Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights in the
States, 65 Sr. JoHN's L. REv. 17, 39 n.40 (1991) (positing the vulnerability of "the use of the
'due process' clause to reach substantive results" and the "perverse transgression of plain
meaning" in the "metamorphosis of a 'due process' clause to a 'due substance' clause");
Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 355 (1981) (noting
"a core issue in modern constitutional theory-the legitimacy of judicial review under
the . . . 'due substance clauses': substantive due process and equal protection").
4. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)); see
also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (A "'substantive due process claim' relies
upon our line of cases which interprets the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee
of 'due process of law' to include a substantive component, which forbids the government
to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided,
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); Nat'l
Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chi., 45 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The doctrine
that goes by the name 'substantive due process' is ... derived from the many constitutional
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actions is an established feature of this nation's constitutional law.5
This Article examines the role that tradition and traditionalism have
long played and continue to play in the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation and application of the Due Process Clauses, and the judi-
cial determination that a claimed right is or is not "a right so fundamental
that it cannot be abridged absent a 'compelling state interest.'"6
As discussed in Part I, tradition-understood here as "simply our name
for the repository of accustomed practices that we withhold from scrutiny
and accept on reflex" 7-has long been one of the factors referenced by
the Court and by individual Justices in decisions recognizing or rejecting
claims that certain governmental conduct violates the due process guar-
antee.8 For those who believe that a judge engaged in the decisional en-
terprise "must take into account past legal and political practice as well as
what the framers themselves intended to say,"9 respect for and considera-
tion of tradition gives credence to the "central traditionalist idea . .. that
one should be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people
who were acting reflectively and in good faith, especially when those
judgments have been reaffirmed . . . over time."10 In the view of legal
traditionalists,
rules that protect personal liberty from unjustified intrusions. The fact that it is a doctrine
owing its existence to constitutional structure rather than a clear grant of power to the
judiciary has led the Supreme Court to be cautious in its use. . . . Only laws that affect
'fundamental rights' come within the purview of this doctrine.").
5. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Despite my misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original matter, I have ac-
quiesced in the Court's incorporation of certain guarantees in the Bill of Rights because it
is both long established and narrowly limited.").
Substantive due process theory and doctrine is an established but (for some) controversial
aspect of constitutional law. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The notion that a constitutional provision
that guarantees only 'process' before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could
define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of
words."); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE By 119 (2012) (The "phrase-'substantive due process'-[ ] bor-
ders on oxymoron." "Substance and process' are typically understood as opposites.");
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)
("'[S]ubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel
redness.'").
6. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003).
7. David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1991); see also
Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 181 (1993) (understanding
tradition as "any combination of acts or statements that together demonstrate a set of
community values or illustrate a common belief system"). Professor Luban distinguishes
"the traditional" from "the past," noting that the latter "can be recent as well as ancient,
whereas tradition must emerge from the practices that by now have become relatively an-
cient." DAVID J. LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM: LAW, MEANING, AND VIOLENCE 105 (1997).
8. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo's Feather: An Examination and
Critique of the Supreme Court's Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Funda-
mental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2006).
9. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 9-10 (1996).
10. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 891 (1996).
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[t]radition is ... an objective criterion that prevents courts from sub-
stituting their own subjective preferences for those of legislatures
. . . . If a tradition was not firmly established at the time of the Fram-
ers or when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, or if a particu-
lar tradition supports a legislative act, the substantive due process
challenge at issue fails."
Traditionalism-more specifically legal traditionalism, which is the in-
terpretation of the Constitution "in accordance with the long-standing
and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation" 12-is a
particular interpretive methodology formulated and employed by mem-
bers of the Court in substantive due process cases.13 A traditionalist
"looks at what decentralized and representative bodies have done, over
time, and treats their consensus as authoritative," and calls for an applica-
tion of the words of the Constitution "as they have been understood by
the people over the course of our constitutional history, from enactment
through the present." 14 Burkean in conception and foundation,15 tradi-
11. Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540-41 (2012).
12. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1998); see also CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY
EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 90 (2005) ("The basic idea"
of traditionalism "is that privacy and liberty rights do not count as such unless they have
been recognized by longstanding traditions.").
13. See generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE
FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 93-121 (2009) (discuss-
ing "due process traditionalism" and examining proffered justifications for the approach);
see also Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1543 (2008).
14. McConnell, supra note 12, at 1136; see also Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1044 (1990) ("[F]or most of the time that human beings have
lived together in organized communities, every aspect of their communal lives-social, re-
ligious, political, and economic as well as legal-has to a large degree been organized on
the assumption that the past has an inherent authority . . . a sanctity that obligates us to
respect the patterns it prescribes. The name that we give this once-pervasive attitude is
traditionalism.").
Traditionalism is distinct from and should not be confused with originalism. Originalists
posit that the meaning of a constitutional provision is discoverable in and determinable by
the original intent of the framers, the original understanding of the ratifiers, the original
public meaning, or other originalist methodologies. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 102 (2011); STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ORIGINALISMs: A QUARTER CENTURY
OF DEBATE 162 (2007). Unlike traditionalism, originalist meaning is fixed and does not
evolve. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in
Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1241 (1998) ("Traditionalism thus differs from
originalism, which draws its normative authority not from historical practice but from a
social contract theory of precommitment by the American people.").
15. Edmund Burke, a proponent of traditionalism, cautioned that current generations
should not ignore the past, "lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful
of what they have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should
act as if they were the entire masters; that they should not think it amongst their rights to
cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance, by destroying at their pleasure the
whole original fabric of their society . . . ." For Burke, "[bjy this unprincipled facility of
changing the state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies
or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No
one generation could link with the other. Men would become little better than the flies of a
summer." EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 192-93 (Con-
ner Cruise O'Brien ed., 1969) (1790). Burke believed that there was an unbroken chain
linking ancestors to the living and "a partnership ... between those who are living, those
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tionalism seeks to insure that judges are not "free to decide as they think
best"16 and will not resort to their personal predilections, policy prefer-
ences, and values as they decide cases.17 Judicial recognition of only those
rights "deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition," Justice
Antonin Scalia has urged, provides "an objective approach that reaches
conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable evidence," which is the
antithesis of "an inherently political, moral judgment" made in
"[d]eciding what is essential to an enlightened, liberty-filled life."' 8
Consider, for instance, Bowers v. Hardwick,19 wherein the Court held
that a Georgia anti-sodomy20 law did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. In so holding, a five-Justice majority asked
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very
long time." 21 In answering that question in the negative, the Court looked
to: the "ancient roots" of prohibitions against what it called "homosexual
sodomy"; the common law; and state proscriptions circa 1791 (the year of
the ratification of the Bill of Rights), 1868 (the year of the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment), 1961, and the time of its 1986 decision.22
"Against this background," the Court concluded, "to claim that a right to
engage in such conduct is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion or is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is, at best, facetious." 23
Seventeen years later, in Lawrence v. Texas,24 the Court upheld a due
process challenge to a Texas statute criminalizing "deviate sexual inter-
course with another individual of the same sex." 25 Asking and answering
in the affirmative the question whether individuals of the same sex "were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their
who are dead, and those who are to be born." EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 80 (J. Pocock ed., 1987) (1790).
For more on Burke's traditionalism, see Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994).
16. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.).
17. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 243
(2009) (noting the contention that another interpretive theory, originalism, "is essential to
constraining judges' ability to impose their own views under the guise of constitutional
interpretation").
18. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3055 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see infra
notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
20. The term "sodomy," coined by eleventh century monks, see Elsewhere, LEGAL AF-
FAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 61, stems from the Old Testament of the Bible and the story of
Sodom and Gomorrah. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND Ho-
MOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRIS-
TIAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 92-93 (1980) ("Sodom in fact gave its name to
homosexual relations in the Latin language, and throughout the Middle Ages the closest
word to 'homosexual' in Latin or any vernacular was 'sodomita."').
21. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
22. See id. at 191-93.
23. Id. at 194 (emphasis omitted).
24. 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see infra notes 239-68 and accompanying text.




liberty under the Due Process Clause," 26 and finding "no longstanding
history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a dis-
tinct matter,"27 the Court reasoned that "[h]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry." 28 The Court surveyed the "laws and traditions of the
past half century," finding therein "an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."29 Bowers was overruled.30
Bowers and Lawrence are important and illustrative exemplars of dis-
cretionary traditionalism and the ways in which judges are free to-and
do-make outcome-influential and even outcome-determinative choices
in their substantive due process decisions. As demonstrated in Parts II
and III, traditionalist methodology as employed by Supreme Court Jus-
tices and federal appeals court judges is discretionary in at least three
ways. First, the traditionalist judge chooses that methodology instead of
other available methodologies and jurisprudential approaches. 3' Second,
the traditionalist judge defines and frames the inquiry before the court,
choosing what she considers to be "the proper level of generality at which
a right should be characterized for purposes of deciding whether it is 'fun-
damental' and therefore protected as a matter of substantive due pro-
cess." 32 Characterizing a right narrowly (for example, do gays and
lesbians have "a fundamental right .. . to engage in sodomy?")33 or more
abstractly (did Georgia's anti-sodomy law violate the plaintiff's "right to
be let alone"?) 3 4 is a critical descriptive as well as normative matter nec-
essarily involving and influenced by a jurist's value choices.35 For exam-
ple, in Bowers the Court's majority framed the claimed right narrowly
and validated the statute, while the dissent framed the claimed right
broadly and would have ruled for the individual. "Since the majority and
the dissent ask different questions, it is not surprising that they give dif-
ferent answers." 36 Finally, the traditionalist judge has discretion to choose
26. Id. at 564.
27. Id. at 568.
28. Id. at 572.
29. Id. at 571-72.
30. See id. at 578.
31. Other interpretive methodologies and jurisprudential approaches available to
judges include originalism, see supra note 14; constitutional text, structure, and purpose;
the consequences of decisions; the application of precedent; and social values. See STEPHEN
BRYER, AcrlVE LIBERTY, INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 8 (2005); Neil
S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 996 n.193 (2008); see
also PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION chs. 2-7
(1982) (setting forth a typology of constitutional argument: historical, textual, doctrinal,
prudential, structural, and ethical).
32. Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. REv. 1, 33-34
(2012).
33. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
34. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
73 (1991).
36. Id. at 74.
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the time frame within which she will look for evidence and confirmation
that the claimed fundamental right did or did not, does or does not, exist.
Does the relevant time frame begin with proscriptions having "ancient
roots" and continue through the late 1790s and mid-1860s to modem
times, as in Bowers, or is the pertinent period the past fifty years as in
Lawrence, or is there some other time span?
Is traditionalism an objective approach and methodology constraining
judicial discretion and impeding the introduction of a judge's subjective
political and moral judgments and personal predilections into the due
process calculus and fundamental rights determination? The answer to
that query is no, because, as argued herein, traditionalism cloaks discre-
tionary judging and subjectivity in the garb of a purportedly objective and
discretion-limiting methodology. That cloak is removed by the careful cri-
tique in the pages that follow.
II. THE TRADITION REFERENT
As discussed in this part, tradition has been referred to and relied upon
by the Court and by individual Justices in various and sundry ways in Due
Process Clause cases. 37 As a general matter, being cognizant of tradition
means that one is aware of and interested in the established structures of
social and legal life, conventions, and practices38 communicated to others
who may "accept beliefs and adopt customs and practices because of in-
stitutional authority." 39
Americans honor and laud traditions so routinely as to make the
need to justify their value seem unnecessary. From religious services,
military honor guards, national holidays, and weddings, to the (ar-
guably) less important opening day pitch, summer-camp songs, and
college football rivalries, traditions evoke pride, nostalgia, and com-
munity spirit." 40
Given the tradition-protective nature of the Due Process Clauses,41 it is
understandable and anticipatable that jurists would be interested in pre-
ceding legal and social views when asked to decide cases presenting chal-
37. Tradition has also been discussed in Court decisions construing other provisions of
the Constitution. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896) (referring "to the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people" in an Equal Protection Clause
challenge); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to an anti-polygamy law and surveying the common law, early English history,
and the laws of the American colonies).
38. See ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 1-3 (Eric Hobsbawm & Ter-
ence Ranger eds., 1983) (discussing what constitutes tradition).
39. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 85 (1998).
40. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 292 (2011); see also JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF
TRADITION 53 (1984) ("[T]radition derives some of its vindication from the sheer facts of
its existence, 'just because it's there' ..... Coming to terms with the presence of the tradi-
tions from which we are derived is, or should be, a fundamental part of the process of
growing up.").
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4,
67 (1996) ("[Tlhe Due Process Clause is generally tradition-protecting.").
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lenges to then-extant conduct and practices, "for such interest reflects
respect for that 'which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the
present."' 42 While substantive due process analysis is thus "suitably back-
ward-looking," 43 what role does (and should) tradition play when it is
contended that government has violated an individual's fundamental
rights and liberty interests?
A. EARLIER DECISIONS
Tradition was an important aspect of the Court's infamous decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford,44 the "birthplace of the controversial idea of sub-
stantive due process." 45 Concluding that African slaves and their de-
scendants were not and could not be citizens under the Constitution,
Chief Justice Roger Taney, writing for the Court, looked to "the legisla-
tion and histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration
of Independence" as well as "the public history of every European na-
tion."46 Blacks had long "been regarded as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or
political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect." 47 A black person was "reduced to slav-
ery for his benefit . .. bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article
of merchandise and traffic," Taney proclaimed. 48 "This opinion was at
that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white race
[and was] regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics." 49 Tradi-
tional views and then-extant moral and political opinions provided the
42. Ronald Turner, Traditionalism, Majoritarian Morality, and the Homosexual Sod-
omy Issue: The Journey from Bowers to Lawrence, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2004) (quot-
ing EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 12 (1981)).
43. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1893, 1897 (2004).
44. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONsT. Amend XIV.
45. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 40 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 758 (1997)
(Souter, J., concurring) (The "most salient instance" of substantive due process review
prior to "the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment" was Dred Scott wherein the "sub-
stantive protection of an owner's property in a slave taken to the territories was traced to
the absence of any enumerated power to affect that property granted to the Congress by
Article I of the Constitution."); AMAR, supra note 5, at 119 ("The phrase [substantive due
process] comes from judges, and the underlying concept has been deployed by judges in
some of the most notorious Court opinions in American history, including the proslavery
1857 ruling in Dred Scott v. Sanford and the pro-sweatshop decision in Lochner v. New
York."). Others have traced the origin of substantive due process judicial review to a dis-
senting opinion by Justice Stephen Johnson Field in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,
97 (1873). See JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 59 n.14 (2003).
46. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. According to Taney, while the words "all men are cre-
ated equal" in the Declaration of Independence "would seem to embrace the whole human
family . . . it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be
included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration." Id.
at 410.
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decisional backdrop for the Court's exclusion of African slaves and their
progenies from constitutional citizenship.
In 1872, the Court held that the state of Illinois could deny to a married
woman the right to practice law without violating the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.50 Bradwell v. State51 held that the
"right to admission to practice in the courts of a State" was not protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, as that "right in no sense depends on
citizenship of the United States." 52 In a concurring opinion, Justice Jo-
seph P. Bradley wrote that, under the common law, "only men were ad-
mitted to the bar, and the legislature had not made any change in this
respect."53 Going beyond the common law, Bradley argued that "the civil
law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman." 54 Women's
"natural and proper timidity" rendered them unfit for many jobs, Bradley
avowed, and the "family organization . . . founded in the divine ordi-
nance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as
that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of woman-
hood."55 A woman's "paramount destiny and mission" was "to fulfil the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Crea-
tor. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general constitu-
tion of things .... ."56
Tradition continued to be a factor of analytical and adjudicatory signifi-
cance as the nation and the Court entered the twentieth century. In Loch-
ner v. New York,57 the Court struck down, as an arbitrary interference
with the liberty and freedom to contract protected by the Due Process
Clause, a New York law prohibiting the employment of bakers for more
than sixty hours per week or more than ten hours per day. Justice Rufus
Wheeler Peckham's opinion for the Court discerned "no reasonable
foundation for holding [New York's law] to be necessary or appropriate
as a health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individ-
uals who are following the trade of a baker."58
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (1868) ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.");
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1987).
51. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 140 (Bradley, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 141.
55. Id.
56. Id. Tradition did not always prevail. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884),
the Court held that a prosecution for murder in the first degree by information and without
indictment by a grand jury did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court declined to hold that due process was limited to and could not go
beyond the settled legal usages of England, for doing so "would be to deny every quality of
our law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to
stamp upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes
and Persians." Id. at 529.
57. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
58. Id. at 58.
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We think that there can be no fair doubt that the trade of a baker,
in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one to that degree which would
authorize the legislature to interfere with the right to labor, and with
the right of free contract on the part of the individual, either as an
employer or employee. In looking through statistics regarding all
trades and occupations, it may be true that the trade of a baker does
not appear as healthy as some other trades, and is also more vastly
healthy than still others. To the common understanding the trade of
a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one . . . . There
must be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some
small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference
with liberty. 59
In any event, the Court concluded that the law was not a health law but
was "an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers
and employees, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as
they may think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties
to such contracts." 60 Accordingly, "the individuals whose rights are thus
made the subject of legislative interference are under the protection of
the Federal Constitution regarding their liberty of contract as well as of
person; and the legislature of the state has no power to limit their right as
proposed in this statute." 6 1
In this dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that "the word
'liberty' . . . is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of
a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe funda-
mental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our
people and our law." 62 Justice John Marshall Harlan's separate dissent
referred to workers' average daily hours in other countries, noted that
such hours were "a subject of serious consideration among civilized peo-
ples," and pointed out that Congress and half the states had passed laws
addressing the issue of the number of hours individuals could work in a
day.6 3 "Many, if not most, of those enactments fix eight hours as the
proper basis of a day's labor." 64
Muller v. Oregon,65 decided a few years after Lochner, upheld the mis-
59. Id. at 59.
60. Id. at 61.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes opined that state constitutions
and laws "regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if
you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this, interfere with the liberty to
contract." Id. at 75. Noting Sunday laws, usury legislation, and state prohibitions of lotter-
ies, he opined that an individual's liberty "to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere
with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known
writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal
institution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or
not." Id. Holmes then made the following well-known statement: "The [Fourteenth]
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Id.
63. Id. at 71-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 72.
65. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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demeanor conviction of an employer who violated a state law by allowing
a female employee to work more than ten hours in a day.6 6 The Court, in
an opinion by Justice David Josiah Brewer, noted that what it called the
"widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions she
performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or
qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil."67
That "widespread belief" was critical to the Court's analysis. 68 Constitu-
tional questions "are not settled by even a consensus of present public
opinion," the Court stated, and where there is a debatable issue of fact,
and "the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long continued
belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cogni-
zance of all matters of general knowledge." 69 Men's liberty to contract,
constitutionalized in Lochner, did not extend to women, for her "physical
structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disad-
vantage in the struggle for subsistence .... This is especially true when
the burdens of motherhood are upon her."70 Because "history discloses
the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man," and must
"look to him for protection," the Court determined that the state was
justified in enacting "legislation to protect her from greed as well as the
passion of man."71
In Twining v. New Jersey,72 the Court, per Justice William Henry
Moody, rejected the argument that the exemption from compulsory self-
incrimination secured against federal action by the Fifth Amendment73
was not safeguarded against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Noting that "[f]ew phrases of the law are so elusive
of exact apprehension as" the Due Process Clause, 74 the Court stated that
it "has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has
66. The Oregon law provided that "no female (shall) be employed in any mechanical
establishment, or factory, or laundry in this State more than ten hours during any one day."
Id. at 416 (quoting statute).
67. Id. at 420.
68. The Court noted that "[]t may not be amiss, in the present case, before examining
the constitutional question, to notice the course of legislation, as well as expressions of
opinion from other judicial sources. In the brief filed by Mr. Louis D. Brandeis . .. is a very
copious collection of all these matters ..... Id. at 419. For a discussion of the "Brandeis
Brief" filed in Muller, see MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, Louis D. BRANDEIS: A LIE 212-18
(2009). For a critique of that brief, see David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15
GREEN BAG 2D 9, 14 (2011), referring to "the outright sexism of Brandeis's brief in
Muller."
69. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420-21.
70. Id. at 421.
71. Id. at 421-22; see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (The Court held that
a Florida law excluding women from jury service was not unconstitutional because "wo-
man is still regarded as the center of home and family life" and it is constitutionally permis-
sible "for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman should
be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines that such ser-
vice is consistent with her own special responsibilities.").
72. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 9 (1964).
73. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (1791) ("No person shall . .. be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself . . .
74. Twining, 211 U.S. at 99-100.
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preferred that its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the pro-
cess of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as
they arise."75 What constitutes
due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those
settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and
statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and
shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this
country. 76
Justice Moody asked whether the self-incrimination exemption is
a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen
of such a government[.] If it is, and if it is of a nature that pertains to
process of law, this court has declared it to be essential to due pro-
cess of law."77
The right against self-incrimination was not established in English law
"during the time when the meaning of due process was in a formative
state, and before it was incorporated in American constitutional law."78
During the debates over the ratification of the Constitution "it appears
that four only of the thirteen original state [sic] insisted upon incorporat-
ing the privilege in the Constitution,"7 9 and that, in framing their consti-
tutions, states (with the exception of New Jersey and Iowa) including a
"due process clause or its equivalent . .. thought [it] necessary to include
separately the privilege clause."80 In addition, the Court looked to its
own decisions in search of helpful analogies and found no case or rule
reconcilable "with the theory that an exemption from compulsory self-
incrimination is included in the conception of due process of law."81 Thus,
Moody concluded, the privilege
has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries
outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere observed
among our own people in the search for truth outside the administra-
tion of the law. It should, must, and will be rigidly observed where it
is secured by specific constitutional safeguards, but there is nothing
in it which gives it sanctity above and before constitutions
themselves. 82
75. Id. at 100.
There are certain general principles, well settled, however, which narrow the
field of discussion, and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These prin-
ciples grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts
on the authority of Coke, that the words 'due process of law' are equivalent
in meaning to the words 'law of the land' [contained in the Magna Charta].
Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 106.
78. Id. at 107.
79. Id. at 109.
80. Id. at 110.
81. Id. at 112.
82. Id. at 113.
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Snyder v. Massachusetts83 held that the defendant's presence at the
jury's view of a crime scene was not a due process right. The Court de-
clared that the state was "free to regulate the procedures of its courts in
accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in doing
so it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."8 4 A few years later,
in Palko v. Connecticut,85 the Court held that the privilege against double
jeopardy86 was not applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. Justice Benjamin Cardozo's opinion for the
Court, asking whether the claimed privilege is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,"87 opined that due process protects only those rights
making up "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,"88 such that
"neither liberty.nor justice would exist if [such rights] were sacrificed." 89
Substantive due process challenges to state regulation of educational
and parental control matters faced tradition-based defenses by states. In
Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a Nebraska statute prohibiting
the teaching of a foreign language to students who had not yet passed the
eighth grade.90 Acknowledging that it had not defined "liberty" with pre-
cision, the Court opined that the term included the right "to marry, estab-
lish a home and bring up children," and that "[t]he American people have
always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted."91 Pierce v.
Society of Sisters92 applied Meyer in ruling that an Oregon statute requir-
ing children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." 93
Liberty "excludes any general power of the State to standardize its chil-
dren by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 94
83. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
84. Id. at 105 (emphasis added).
85. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .....
87. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 326.
90. 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
91. Id. at 399, 400.
92. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
93. Id. at 534-35.
94. Id. at 535; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (citing Meyer, Pierce, and
other cases and stating that "it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions con-
cerning the care, custody, and control of their children."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific
freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause includes the right[ ] . .. to direct the education and upbringing of one's chil-
dren."); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (referring to the "fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child");
Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has reflected




In the 1960s the Court began to grapple with the constitutionality of
state laws criminalizing certain reproductive choices and practices. In Poe
v. Ullman,95 the Court agreed to review and then dismissed as not justici-
able cases challenging a Connecticut statute making it a crime to use or
give medical advice concerning the use of contraceptives. Justice John
Marshall Harlan wrote an important dissenting opinion setting forth his
views of the meaning and substance of the Constitution's due process
guarantee: due process cannot be reduced to a formula and is not found
in any code, he opined.96 "The best that can be said is that through the
course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." 97
That balance "is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the
traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing."98 Caution-
ing that judges should not feel "free to roam where unguided speculation
might take them," and "may not draw on ... merely personal and private
notions," 99 Harlan maintained that "[n]o formula could serve as a substi-
tute, in this area, for judgment and restraint"1oo or recognition of "consid-
erations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the
legal profession." 01
minor children."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture
of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companion-
ship, care, custody, and management of his or her children comes to this Court with a
momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements.") (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
95. See 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
96. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S.
Ct. 2308, 2340 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("We recognize the value and lessons of continuity
with the past, but as Justice Harlan pointed out, society finds reasons to modify some of its
traditional practices . . . .").
99. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542, 544.
100. Id. at 542.
101. Id. at 545 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952)). Interest-
ingly, Justice Harlan would not have provided due process protection against state disap-
proval of same-sex sexual orientation or certain other sexual practices. Id. at 547.
Observing that society was traditionally concerned with the "moral soundness of its peo-
ple," he believed that the "attempt [to draw] a line between public behavior and that which
is purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal." Id. at
546. In his view, laws regarding marriage and prohibiting homosexual practices, fornica-
tion, and adultery "form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life
that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must be built upon that basis." Id. at 546.
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The Connecticut anti-contraception law was again before the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut.102 In that case, the Court held that the state's
law unconstitutionally intruded on the right of marital privacy located in
the "penumbras" of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights "formed by ema-
nations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."103
Marriage is "older than the Bill of Rights" and "our school system" and
"is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social
projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions."104
Justice Arthur Goldberg, joining in the Court's judgment and opinion,
emphasized the Ninth Amendment 05 and observed that "judges are not
left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.
Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of
our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to
be ranked as fundamental.'" 0 6 Responding to Goldberg, Justice Hugo
Black (finding the Connecticut law "abhorrent, just viciously evil, but not
unconstitutional")' 07 did not know of "a gadget which the Court can use
to determine what traditions are rooted" in the conscience of the peo-
ple.108 Rejecting the view that it was "the duty of [the] Court to keep the
Constitution in tune with the times," Black wrote that "[t]he Constitution
makers knew the need for change and provided for it"109 in the amend-
ment procedures of Article V of the document.110 "That method . . . was
good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add that
it is good enough for me.""'
In 1967 the Court considered the constitutionality of a Virginia statute
criminalizing certain interracial marriages in Loving v. Virginia.112 The
102. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
103. Id. at 484 (noting that the zone of privacy is created and bound by the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
104. Id. at 486. This ode to marriage was written by Justice William 0. Douglas, who
was married and divorced several times. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE
LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 392 (1st ed. 2003). Griswold was later ap-
plied in a case involving a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried persons. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court held that
such statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the de-
cision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
106. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Common-
wealth of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
107. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 557 (2d ed. 1997).
108. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 522.
110. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
111. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 531 (Dissenting,
Justice Potter Stewart argued that those not satisfied with the Connecticut law can "per-
suade their elected representatives to repeal it. That is the constitutional way to take this
law off the books.").
112. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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state contended that the statute was constitutional and should be upheld,
noting that "for over 100 years, since the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted, numerous states-as late as 1956, the majority of the states-
and now even 16 states, have been exercising" the power to prohibit in-
terracial marriages "without any question being raised as to the authority
of the state to exercise this power.""13 Rejecting the state's position and
holding that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause,114 the
Court also concluded that the law deprived individuals of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause." 5 "[T]he freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State."11 6 Traditional and historical practices did not pro-
vide legitimate grounds for, and therefore did not constitutionalize, the
challenged racial discrimination.
C. THE 1970s
The Court's seminal decision in Roe v. Wade"'7 determined, among
other things, that the abortion right was not one that had been tradition-
ally proscribed. Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion for the Court ex-
amined "[a]ncient attitudes," the origins of the Hippocratic Oath,
common law, English statutory law, and the laws of the states.U18 "[A]t
common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and
throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed
with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in ef-
fect."119 A woman's choice to terminate a pregnancy "was present in this
country well into the 19th century," Blackmun wrote, and "[e]ven later,
the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion pro-
cured in early pregnancy. "120
Then Justice (later Chief Justice) William H. Rehnquist, dissenting,
premised his argument on a different view and formulation of tradition.
He argued that a half-century of abortion restrictions in a majority of
states was "a strong indication .. . that the asserted right to an abortion is
not 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental.'"121 Rehnquist noted that at least thirty-six state
113. Oral Argument, Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E. 2d 75 (Va. 1966) (No. 395), in 64
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (Philip B. Kurkland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975).
114. The Court concluded that Virginia's law was "obviously an endorsement of the
doctrine of White Supremacy" and found "no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination" saving the law from invalidation under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 11.
115. See id. at 12.
116. Id.
117. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that Texas's criminal law anti-abortion statute was
unconstitutional).
118. Id. at 130-41.
119. Id. at 140.
120. Id. at 141.
121. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)).
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or territorial laws limited abortion in 1868 (the year of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment); that the laws of twenty-one states in effect
in 1868 were still in effect at the time of the Court's decision; and that the
Texas law reviewed by the Court in Roe was first enacted in 1857 and was
essentially the same law struck down by the Roe majority.122 In his view,
an abortion ban was constitutional because a majority of the states had
prohibited the practice in the past.
Tradition was again front and center in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land.123 A city ordinance limiting the occupancy of a dwelling unit to
members of a single nuclear family was challenged under the Due Process
Clause.124 Justice Lewis F. Powell's plurality opinion, joined by Justices
William F. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Harold A. Blackmun, noted
that substantive due process cases present the concern that "[t]here are
risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain sub-
stantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights."125 Referencing the Lochner era,126 Powell wrote that
"there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial interven-
tion become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it
does not counsel abandonment."127 Powell turned to and relied on the
tradition and history of the family, a tradition including the nuclear fam-
ily as well as the "tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grand-
parents sharing a household . . . and equally deserving of constitutional
recognition."12 8 As extended family households were part of this nation's
traditions, the city could not constitutionally standardize children and
adults "by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family
patterns."129
Justice Byron White criticized Justice Powell's approach as one sug-
gesting "a far too expansive charter . . . . What the deeply rooted tradi-
tions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve the protection
122. Id. at 175-77.
123. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
124. The challenge to the city ordinance was made by Inez Moore who lived in her East
Cleveland home with her son and two grandsons. The grandsons were first cousins and not
brothers, as one child came to live with Moore and her son and his child after the death of
the child's mother. See id. at 496-97.
125. Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
126. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
127. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 504. Justice Brennan, writing to "underscore the cultural myopia of the arbi-
trary boundary drawn by the East Cleveland ordinance," stated that "[in today's America,
the 'nuclear family' is the pattern so often found in much of white suburbia . . . . The
Constitution cannot be interpreted, however, to tolerate the imposition by government
upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family living." Id. at
507-08 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Potter Stewart did not "understand why it follows
that the residents of East Cleveland are constitutionally prevented from following what
Mr. Justice Brennan calls the 'pattern' of 'white suburbia,' even though that choice may
reflect 'cultural myopia.' In point of fact, East Cleveland is a predominantly Negro com-
munity, with a Negro City Manager and City Commission." Id. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
129. Id. at 506 (plurality opinion).
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of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable."130 Warning that the
plurality's analysis would unduly broaden the scope of substantive due
process review, White stated:
The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and comes
nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the
design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present construction of
the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms,
as well as on the anticipation of the Framers ... the Court should be
extremely reluctant to breathe still further substantive content into
the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legislation adopted by a
State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the Judiciary does so,
it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the governance of
the country without express constitutional authority.131
III. DISCRETIONARY TRADITIONALISM AND THE COURT
Traditionalism is more than an awareness of and reference to tradi-
tions, customs, conventions, practices and accepted (by some) beliefs.132
As used and understood herein, traditionalism is a methodology in which
the Constitution is interpreted in accordance with the long-standing and
evolving practices and traditions of the nation. 33 This Part focuses on the
resort to and use of traditionalism in substantive due process cases, and
the concern expressed by proponents of the methodology that judges not
tethered to tradition may feel "free to roam where unguided speculation
might take them" and discretionarily "draw on . . . merely personal and
private notions."1 34
Contrary to this discretion-limiting rationale, there are at least three
ways in which traditionalism is in fact a discretionary and non-con-
straining interpretive approach. First, a judge's selection of traditionalism
over and instead of other interpretive methodologies and jurisprudential
approaches is in fact a choice and an exercise of discretion. Second, a
traditionalist judge is free to frame the inquiry and to choose and define
the level of generality at which a right is characterized narrowly or more
abstractly. The judge's discretionary framing and choice of an operative
level of generality are critical aspects of the substantive due process in-
quiry, for the question posed and the selected characterization of the
claimed right can predictably foreshadow an answer recognizing or deny-
ing recognition of the asserted fundamental right. Finally, the traditional-
ist judge discretionarily determines the time frame she will explore and
examine in her quest for evidence concerning the nation's deeply rooted
traditions and confirmation that the claimed fundamental right does or
does not exist.
130. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 544.
132. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
134. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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A. BoWERS V. HARDWICK
In 1986, the Court issued its decision in Bowers v. Hardwickl35 wherein
it validated the state of Georgia's anti-sodomy statute.136 Writing for the
Court, Justice White (joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices
Rehnquist, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Powell)' 37 set forth his view of
the issue before the Court. The due process challenge was not about
"whether laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general, or
between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable."138 Nor, in his
view, did the case involve the question of states' rights to repeal legisla-
tion criminalizing such conduct or the power of state courts to strike
down laws under state constitutions. 1 3 9 Rather, the issue was "whether
the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals
to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time."140
Having articulated the majority's framing of the issue, Justice White
rejected the argument that certain cases in the Court's privacy jurispru-
dence-involving child rearing and education, family relationships, mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, and abortion-decided the
aforementioned question.141 Undertaking what has been described as a
"flat and disdainful" review of the historical record,142 White determined
that there was no "fundamental right to engage in homosexual sod-
omy"'14 3 because sodomy proscriptions "have ancient roots;"144 sodomy
was a common-law criminal offense "forbidden by the laws of the original
thirteen States when they ratified the Bill of Rights" in 1791; "all but 5 of
the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws" when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified in 1868; and "until 1961, all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today 24 States and the District of Columbia con-
tinue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
135. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For
more on this case, see Turner, supra note 42, at 47-59.
136. The statute provided that "a person commits the offense of sodomy when he or
she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (West 1981). Persons convicted of
violating that provision were subject to the punishment of imprisonment for not less than
one or more than twenty years. See id.
137. Justice Powell subsequently stated that he "probably made a mistake" when he
voted with the majority in Bowers. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIs F. POWELL,
JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 530 (1994).
138. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
139. See id.
140. Id. The Court's framing of the issue is "somewhat problematical, because the stat-
ute on its face applied to all forms of sodomy, heterosexual as well as homosexual, and,
given the history of its enforcement, Hardwick was in no greater danger of prosecution
than any heterosexual." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 117 (1990).
141. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (collecting cases).
142. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 90 (2003).
143. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
144. Id. at 193.
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between consenting adults." 145 "Against this background," White con-
cluded, "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty' is, at best, facetious." 146 (Interestingly, as Judge Richard
Posner has noted, Michael Hardwick was arrested for conduct not prohib-
ited by the common law: "common law sodomy did not include fellatio"
and "sodomy at common law was limited to anal intercourse. The exten-
sion of the proscription to oral sex came late in the nineteenth century,
after the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment." 147)
Reprising the analysis of his dissent in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land,148 Justice White remarked that the Court sought "to assure itself
and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in the Con-
stitution's text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices'
own choice of values on the States and the Federal Government."1 49 Con-
cerned about the Court's institutional vulnerability and legitimacy, and
resisting the expansion of the Due Process Clause and a judicial defini-
tion/redefinition of the category of fundamental rights, White declined to
take to the Court "further authority to govern the country without ex-
press constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed on us today falls
far short of overcoming this resistance." 50
Writing separately, Chief Justice Burger stated that homosexual sod-
omy had "been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."s'5 Sodomy was prohibited
during the English Reformation and criminalized by the common law, he
noted, and Blackstone referred to sodomy as "an offense of 'deeper ma-
lignity' than rape."152 "To hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is
somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millen-
145. Id. at 192-94. Commenting on this aspect of Justice White's opinion, one commen-
tator argued that "[t]his kind of gross historical enumeration is not even conclusive in giv-
ing the best interpretation of the original meaning of a broad general principle." CHARLES
FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND Ac-
COUNT 82 (1991). "White invokes practices and understandings to preclude reasoning, not
to assist it." Id.
146. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194; see RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 343 (1992)
(noting White's "facetious" argument and commenting that "the same thing could be said
of the rights recognized in the earlier sexual privacy cases").
147. POSNER, supra note 146, at 343.
148. 431 U.S. 494 (1977); see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
149. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
150. Id. at 195. The Court also concluded that the belief by a majority of Georgia's
electorate that homosexual sodomy was "immoral and unacceptable" was an adequate ra-
tionale for the anti-sodomy law. Id. at 196. "The law ... is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under
the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Id. Disagreeing with that
view, Justice Blackmun opined that moral judgments that are "natural and familiar . . .
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
152. Id. at 197 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 215).
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nia of moral teaching."153
Four Justices dissented. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and John Paul Stevens, rejected the majority's description of
the issue before the Court. The claim made was not about the right to
engage in homosexual sodomy, Blackmun argued, but was instead con-
cerned with the right to be left alone free from exposure to criminal sanc-
tions enforced against homosexuals but not heterosexuals. 154 He did not
agree with the Court "that either the length of time a majority has held its
convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw leg-
islation from this Court's scrutiny." 55
Justice Blackmon echoed Justice Holmes in stating that
"[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." I be-
lieve we must analyze Hardwick's claim in the light of the values that
underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right means any-
thing, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for
making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must
do more than assert that the choice they have made is an "abomina-
ble crime not fit to be named among Christians."1 5 6
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens argued that "the Georgia statute
expresses the traditional view that sodomy is an immoral kind of conduct
regardless of the identity of the persons who engage in it."'s? Like Justice
Blackmun, Justice Stevens rejected the Court's traditional-therefore-con-
stitutional analysis: "the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor
tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional
attack."158 Justice Stevens looked to a tradition different from that for-
mulated and relied upon by the majority. "Guided by history, our tradi-
tion of respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of
153. Id.
154. See id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that al-
though the sex or status of the person engaging in sodomy was not relevant under the
Georgia statute, see supra note 136, the state "enforce[d] against homosexuals a law it
seems not to have any desire to enforce against heterosexuals." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 200-01
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 210 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
156. Id. at 199-200 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting initially Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897) and then Herring
v. State, 46 S.E.2d 876, 882 (1904)). Justice Blackmun also rejected the state's invocation of
the Bible as support for its position. Condemnation of homosexual sodomy by some relig-
ious groups "gives the State no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry."
Id. at 211. Thus, "the invocation of Leviticus, Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's
heretical status during the Middle Ages undermines" the assertion that the Georgia law
"represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power." Id.




conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal system, federal judges
have accepted the responsibility for recognition and protection of these
rights in appropriate cases."159 Acknowledging society's right to en-
courage individuals to adhere to certain traditions in matters of affection
and gratification, Justice Stevens emphasized that liberty "surely em-
braces the right to engage in nonreprodutive, sexual conduct that others
may consider offensive or immoral."' 60
Bowers reflected and gave operational effect to a specific form of tradi-
tionalism, one "found" in the common law; the laws of the original thir-
teen states at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791; the
laws of the states at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868; and in state-law prohibitions of sodomy circa 1961 and as of
the date of the Court's 1986 decision. This methodology and count-the-
states approach to constitutional interpretation and adjudication constitu-
tionalized a Court-determined tradition, thereby allowing a Court openly
concerned about its legitimacy and public standing to present its decision
as one deferring to the traditional views of a majority of the Georgia
electorate.161 The Court's decision illustrates the importance of the iden-
tification and articulation of the (Court's description and choice of the)
pertinent tradition by which the constitutionality of the challenged state
law is to be assessed.
B. MICHAEL H. v. GERALD D.
Traditionalism and the debate over the methodology were on display in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,162 in which the Court held that California law
presuming that a child born to a married woman was a child of the mar-
riage did not violate the due process rights of the child's biological father,
not married to the mother, who sought parental and visitation rights.
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia declared that
the purpose of the Due Process Clause "is to prevent future generations
from lightly casting aside important traditional values-not to enable this
Court to invent new ones."163 Invoking societal tradition, he asked
whether the relationship between the biological father and the child "has
been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society" or "has been accorded special protection," and ultimately stated,
"We think it impossible to find that it has."'6 For Justice Scalia, the tradi-
tion protecting the marital family unit from the biological father's claim
159. Id. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir.
1975)).
160. Id. at 217-18.
161. "States could simply declare that legislators, speaking for a majority of the perti-
nent electorate, enacted laws banning homosexual sodomy because such sodomy is im-
moral; no other showing was required." Turner, supra note 42, at 59.
162. 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
163. Id. at 122 n.2 (plurality opinion).
164. Id. at 124. Justice Scalia reasoned that the biological father had to establish that
society traditionally accorded or did not traditionally deny to him parental rights. See id. at
126. It was not enough-in fact, it was "ultimately irrelevant"-that a number of states
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was found in the common law as indicated in older sources, including
Henry de Bracton's work De Legibus, Blackstone's and Kent's respective
commentaries, and a 1957 American Law Reports annotation on the pre-
sumption of the legitimacy of children conceived and born in wedlock.165
In the sixth footnote to his opinion, joined only by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice Scalia set out a specific methodology governing the identifi-
cation of the relevant tradition in due process cases. "We refer to the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified."1 6 6 Consulting the most
specific tradition is necessary, in his view, because "general traditions
provide such imprecise guidance . . . [and] permit judges to dictate rather
than discern the society's views."' 67
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, did not agree with Justice
Scalia's most-specific-level approach. In her view, that method "sketches
a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests
protected by the Due Process Clause . . . that may be somewhat inconsis-
tent with our past decisions in this area."1 68 The Court had previously
characterized rights-protecting traditions at "levels of generality that
might not be 'the most specific level available.'" 69 Noting with approval
Justice Harlan's due process analysis in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,170
she declined to "foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a
single mode of historical analysis." 171
Critiquing Justice Scalia's analysis, Justice Brennan opined that the
concept of "tradition" "can be as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty' it-
self."172 "[W]herever I would begin to look for an interest 'deeply rooted
in the country's traditions,"' he stated,
one thing is certain: I would not stop . . . at Bracton, or Blackstone,
or Kent, or even the American Law Reports in conducting my
search. Because reasonable people can disagree about the content of
particular traditions, and because they can disagree even about
which traditions are relevant to the definition of 'liberty,' the plural-
ity has not found the objective boundary that it seeks.173
Nor had Justice Scalia supplied an "objective means" for determining
"the point at which a tradition becomes firm enough to be relevant to our
tradition of liberty and the moment at which it becomes too obsolete to
gave the biological father "the theoretical power to rebut the marital presumption." Id. at
127.
165. See id. at 124-26.
166. Id. at 127 n.6.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
169. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and other Court decisions).
170. 367 U.S. 497 (1961); see supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
171. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).




be relevant any longer."1 74
Justice Brennan believed that tradition was relevant to the Court's pre-
vious rulings in cases involving marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and
other practices and interests. The Court's protection of those interests
was partially "the result of the fact that the Due Process Clause would
seem an empty promise if it did not protect them, and partly the result of
the historical and traditional importance of those interests in our soci-
ety."175 As to what interest was at issue in Michael H., Brennan did not
adopt Justice Scalia's question of whether a specific type of parenthood
("a natural father's relationship with a child whose mother is married to
another man") was protected.176 Invoking legal-and not a posited socie-
tal-tradition, Justice Brennan asked instead "whether parenthood is an
interest that historically has received our attention and protection; the
answer to that question is too clear for dispute."' 77 If the Court had asked
whether the specific interest or practice was traditionally protected in its
earlier cases involving the use of contraceptives' 78 and other matters,
"the answer would have been a resounding 'no.' That [they] did not ask
this question in those cases highlights the novelty of the interpretive
method that the plurality opinion employs today."' 79
For Justice Brennan, Justice Scalia "acts as if the only purpose of the
Due Process Clause is to confirm the importance of interests already pro-
tected by a majority of the States. Transforming the protection afforded
by the Due Process Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with care
and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth Amendment."180 Noting that "[w]e
are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic
one,"18 Brennan stated:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to
me. It is not the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitu-
tion; it is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in
thp prejudices and superstitions of a time long past. This Constitu-
tion does not recognize that times change, does not see that some-
times a practice or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an
interpretive method that does such violence to the charter that I am
bound by oath to uphold.'8 2
174. Id. at 138.
175. Id. at 139; see also Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne,
129 S. Ct. 2308, 2340 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Tradition is of course one serious
consideration in judging whether a challenged rule or practice, or the failure to provide a
new one, should be seen as violating the guarantee of substantive due process as being
arbitrary, or as falling wholly outside the realm of reasonable governmental action.").
176. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 165 and ac-
companying text.
177. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
179. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 140-41.
181. Id. at 141.
182. Id.
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As can be seen, Justice Scalia and Justice Brennan both refer to tradi-
tion as they analyzed the issue before the Court in Michael H. But:
[t]he traditions on which they depend are different: Scalia prefers to
defer to societal or communitarian tradition, whereas Brennan wants
to rely on the traditions identified in the judicial precedent from a
particular era. Both, nevertheless, define liberty in terms of past tra-
dition rather than, for example, by reference to some understanding
of the ideally free or autonomous individualist life. 183
Both exercised discretion in their dissimilar framing of the due process
inquiry (as did Justices O'Connor and Kennedy), the formulation of the
level of generality, and the description of what constitutes a "deeply
rooted tradition."
C. CRUZAN v. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Whether Nancy Beth Cruzan, a patient in a persistent vegetative state,
had "a right under the United States Constitution which would require
the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment" was the query, as
framed by the Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health.184 More specifically, the Court asked whether the Constitution
prohibited the establishment of Missouri's procedural requirement that
an incompetent person's wishes regarding the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence.185
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "as-
sume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent
person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition." 186 Rejecting the argument that an incompetent person
possessed the same right, the Court held that Missouri's clear-and-con-
vincing evidence requirement did not violate the Due Process Clause.187
A state may rely on its interest in the protection and preservation of
human life and is not "required to remain neutral in the face of an in-
formed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death." 88 In the context presented in Cruzan, "Missouri may legitimately
seek to safeguard the personal element of this choice [between life and
death] through the imposition of heightened evidentiary require-
ments."189 Furthermore, a state may appropriately "decline to make
judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may en-
joy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
183. Robin L. West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1991).
184. 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
185. See id. at 280.
186. Id. at 279.
187. Id. at 284 ("[A] State may apply a clear and convincing evidence standard in pro-
ceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person diag-
nosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.").
188. Id. at 280.
189. Id. at 281.
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human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests
of the individual."1 90 While the individual and societal interests are both
substantial, the Court determined that the state "may permissibly place
an increased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate
an incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment."191
Writing separately, Justice Scalia expressed his preference for an an-
nouncement, "clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no busi-
ness in this field."1 92 A claimant seeking to maintain a substantive due
process claim must demonstrate "that the State has deprived him of a
right historically and traditionally protected against state interference." 193
Suicide was a crime under English common law, was generally held to be
a criminal offense in case law existing at the time of the 1868 adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, would have been criminalized by a penal
law system presented to the House of Representatives in 1828, and was
criminalized by "[m]ost States that did not explicitly prohibit assisted sui-
cide in 1868 . . . when the issue arose in the 50 years following the Four-
teenth Amendment's ratification."1 9 4 Justice Scalia thus concluded that
"there is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide is so
rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed fundamental or implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."195
In separate dissents Justices Brennan and Stevens articulated different
conceptions of tradition. For Brennan, the "right to be free from medical
attention without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's
own body, is deeply rooted in this Nation's traditions .... This right has
long been firmly entrenched in American tort law and is securely
grounded in the earliest common law." 196 In his view, Nancy Cruzan's
fundamental right was not outweighed by a state interest and "there is no
good to be obtained here by Missouri's insistence that Nancy Cruzan re-
main on life-support systems if it is indeed her wish not to do so."197
Justice Stevens looked to "decisional law, and the constitutional tradition
which it illuminates."1 98
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our
own mortality are undoubtedly so rooted in the traditions and con-
science of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, and indeed are
essential incidents of the unalienable rights to life and liberty en-
190. Id. at 282.
191. Id. at 283.
192. Id. at 293 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 294 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)).
194. Id. at 295.
195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also id. ("Thus, freedom from unwanted medical attention is unquestionably
among those principles so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
197. Id. at 312.
198. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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dowed us by our Creator.199
Moreover, "[o]ur ethical tradition has long regarded an appreciation of
mortality as essential to understanding life's significance." 2 0 0
D. PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF SOUTHEASTERN
PENNSYLVANIA V. CASEY
The Court's 1992 Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey201 decision, reaffirming the central holding of Roe v. Wade, contin-
ued the debate among Justices over the questions of whether and how
tradition should be considered and used in substantive due process cases.
A joint opinion202 for a plurality of the Court, authored by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, stated that it was "tempting ... to sup-
pose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at
the most specific level, that were protected against governmental interfer-
ence by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied." 203 Rejecting that view, the joint opinion concluded: "Neither the
Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substan-
tive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." 204
Grounding their analysis in Justice Harlan's Poe v. Ullman dissent,205
the joint opinion stated that the "inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting
the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not suscep-
tible of expression as a simple rule." 206 The Court's "obligation is to de-
fine the liberty of all, not to mandate [the justices'] own moral code,"
with liberty including "matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy."207 Liberty includes "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." 208
Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas)
expressed his belief "that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and
199. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id.
201. 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (plurality opinion).
202. The second in the Court's history. See Kevin Yamamoto & Shelby A. D. Moore, A
Trust Analysis of a Gestational Carrier's Right to Abortion, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 138
n.239 (2001) (explaining that prior to Casey the "writing of a joint opinion ... occurred
only one other time in the history of the Court").
203. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (plurality opinion).
204. Id. at 848 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
205. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
206. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (plurality opinion).
207. Id. at 850-51.
208. Id. at 851.
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should be overruled." 209 In his view, "the historical traditions of the
American people" did not "support the view that the right to terminate
one's pregnancy is 'fundamental.' 2 1 0 Relying on his dissent in Roe,211
Rehnquist noted that abortion after "quickening" was a common-law of-
fense this nation inherited from England, was prohibited by law in 1868 in
twenty-eight of the thirty-seven states and eight territories, was prohib-
ited or restricted by nearly all of the states at the beginning of the twenti-
eth century, and was proscribed by twenty-one laws in effect in 1973.212
"On this record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of
relatively unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification
of the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process
Clause." 213
Justice Scalia took issue with the joint opinion's call for reasoned judg-
ment and conception of liberty as protecting intimate and personal
choices involving personal autonomy and bodily integrity. Noting Bowers
v. Hardwick, he argued that the plurality's approach could be applied to
homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, "all of which
can constitutionally be proscribed because it is our unquestionable consti-
tutional tradition that they are proscribable. It is not reasoned judgment
that supports the Court's decision; only personal predilection." 2 14 Accus-
ing the Court of anti-traditional and anti-democratic behavior, Scalia
opined that "the American people love democracy and the American
people are not fools." 2 1 5
E. WASHINGTON v. GLUCKSBERG
The Court in Washington v. Glucksberg held that the state of Washing-
ton's prohibition of physician-assisted suicide did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.216 According to the plaintiffs,
the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment extended to
and protected the "liberty of competent, terminally ill adults to make
end-of-life decisions free of undue government interference." 2 1 7 The
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not accept that for-
mulation and instead asked "whether the protections of the Due Process
Clause include a right to commit suicide with another's assistance." 2 1 8
209. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
210. Id. at 952.
211. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
212. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952 (Rehnquist, C. J. concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
213. Id. at 952-53.
214. Id. at 984 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
215. Id. at 1000.
216. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
217. Id. at 724 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 10).
218. Id.; see also id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court's fram-
ing of the issue and seeing no need to reject the narrower question of "whether a mentally
competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable in-
terest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death"); id. at 741 (Stevens,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist set forth two elements of the substantive due
process analysis.
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause spe-
cially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob-
jectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, we have re-
quired in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.219
Turning to history and tradition, he wrote that "[i]n almost every
State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist
a suicide." 220 Citing Henry de Bracton's treatise and Blackstone's Com-
mentaries, Rehnquist noted that suicide and assisting that act were pun-
ished by "the Anglo-American common-law tradition." 221 The American
colonies adopted this view, and "colonial and early state legislatures and
courts did not retreat from prohibiting assisted suicide." 222 "By the time
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was a crime in most States to
assist a suicide," and subsequently the Model Penal Code prohibited such
conduct; the ban had been generally reaffirmed by voters and
legislatures. 223
Employing a restrained methodology,224 the Chief Justice concluded
that the asserted right to assisted suicide had no place in this country's
traditions. The "consistent and almost universal tradition . . . has long
rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even
for terminally ill, mentally competent adults." 225 As
[t]he history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country
has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts
to permit it . .. our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted
'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental lib-
J., concurring in the judgments) ("I fully agree with the Court that the 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause does not include a categorical 'right to commit suicide which
itself includes a right to assistance in doing so."'). Justice Breyer did not agree with the
Court's formulation of the asserted liberty interest and offered a different formulation
for which our legal traditions may provide greater support. That formulation
would use words roughly like a "right to die with dignity." But irrespective of
the exact words used, at its core would lie personal control over the manner
of death, professional medical assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary
and severe physical suffering-combined.
Id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
219. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 710.
221. Id. at 711-12.
222. Id. at 714.
223. Id. at 715-16.
224. A restrained methodology "tends to rein in the subjective elements that are neces-
sarily present in due process judicial review" and "avoids the need for complex balancing
of competing interests in every case." Id. at 722.
225. Id. at 723.
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erty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 226
F. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO V. LEWIS
In light of Glucksberg, one could have understandably concluded that
traditionalism was the interpretive methodology to be employed in due
process cases. 227 However, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court
did not apply that approach in a case involving the question whether a
police officer violated constitutional due-process guarantees by causing
the death of a suspect during a high-speed chase. 228 Answering that ques-
tion in the negative, a Court majority (including Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the author of the Court's decision in Glucksberg)229 applied the "shocks
the conscience" test set out in Rochin v. California,230 Collins v. City of
Harker Heights,231 and other cases. "[F]or half a century now we have
spoken of the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that which
shocks the conscience," the Court said; finding no intent to harm or
worsen the suspect's legal interests, it concluded that the challenged con-
duct failed to meet the shocks-the-conscience standard.232
A concurring Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the
Court's opinion was a "throw back to highly subjective substantive-due-
process methodologies" and 'resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon
Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity, th' ol'
'shocks-the-conscience' test."233 Adhering to Glucksberg, he asked not
"whether the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected con-
science," but "whether our Nation has traditionally protected the right
respondents assert." 234 Finding no textual, historical, or precedential sup-
port for the claimed right, and refusing to "fashion a new due process
right out of thin air," Scalia concluded that the Constitution had not been
violated. 235
G. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Was the Due Process Clause violated by a Texas statute criminalizing
226. Id. at 728; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (New York law prohibiting
assisted suicide did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
227. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 672.
228. 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
229. See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text.
230. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the forced pumping of a suspect's stomach
"shocks the conscience").
231. 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (holding that substantive due process is violated by execu-
tive conduct when such conduct "can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience
shocking, in a constitutional sense").
232. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846, 854-55.
233. Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 861 n.1 ("For those
unfamiliar with classical music, I note that the exemplars of excellence in the text are bor-
rowed from Cole Porter's 'You're the Top' .....
234. Id. at 862.
235. Id. (quoting Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996)).
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"deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex"? 2 3 6
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the statute was
unconstitutional. 237
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the majority, joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, opened as follows:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of
our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not
be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more tran-
scendent dimensions.238
Justice Kennedy then framed the question before the Court: "whether
the petitioners [John Lawrence and Tyron Garner] were free as adults to
engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the
Due Process Clause." 239 Recall that in Bowers v. Hardwick240 the Court
asked whether there was a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy.2 4 1 In Kennedy's view, the Bowers Court's framing of the issue
"discloses the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty
at stake." 242
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in
certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said that mar-
riage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. The laws
involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport to
do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching
upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the
most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recogni-
tion in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals.243
Concluding that Bowers had to be reconsidered, Justice Kennedy dis-
agreed with the Court's 1986 view that anti-sodomy laws have "ancient
roots." 2 4 4 He did not find any "longstanding history in this country of
236. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994).
237. 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
238. Id. at 562; see also JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 266 (2013) (noting that Lawrence "frames the
right asserted quite abstractly: liberty in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions").
239. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
240. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
241. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
242. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 567; see supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter" 245 and deter-
mined that "early American sodomy laws were not directed at homosexu-
als as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity
more generally."246 Applying a desuetude analysis,247 Kennedy decided
that the absence of a record of enforcement of anti-sodomy laws against
consenting adults engaging in such conduct in private was significant, as
the infrequency of prosecutions "makes it difficult to say that society ap-
proved of a rigorous and systematic punishment" of such acts.2 4 8 Indeed,
Kennedy noted, same-sex sodomy was not targeted until the latter third
of the twentieth century, state laws criminalizing same-sex relations did
not occur before the 1970s, and only nine states had prohibited the con-
duct. 249 Thus, he concluded, the history and tradition relied upon in Bow-
ers "are not without doubt and, at the very least, are overstated." 2 5 0
Having questioned the accuracy of the Bowers Court's traditionalist
analysis, Justice Kennedy made clear that tradition was not determina-
tive: "History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry." 251 Moreover, and
significantly, he did not look back to colonial times, 1791, 1868, or other
time periods as did the Court in Bowers.252 Instead, he identified "our
laws and traditions in the past half century" 253 as the relevant time period
and found therein "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives
in matters pertaining to sex." 254 Accordingly, "Bowers was not correct
245. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568. According to Justice Kennedy, English anti-sodomy
laws prohibited "relations between men and women," and "[n]ineteenth-century commen-
tators similarly read American sodomy, buggery, and crime-against-nature statutes as
criminalizing certain relations between men and women and between men and men." Id.
246. Id. "This does not suggest approval of homosexual conduct. It does tend to show
that this particular form of conduct was not thought of as a separate category from like
conduct between heterosexual persons." Id. at 568-69.
247. The desuetude doctrine "forbids the use of old laws lacking current public support,
to require more in the way of accountability and deliberation." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1999). For further
discussion of this doctrine, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLrIcS 155 (1st ed. 1962); GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 19-26 (1982).
248. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569-70. Responding to Justice Kennedy on this point, Jus-
tice Scalia argued that "[i]f all the Court means by 'acting in private' is 'on private prem-
ises, with the doors closed and windows covered,' it is entirely unsurprising that evidence
of enforcement would be hard to come by." Id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 570 (majority opinion).
250. Id. at 571.
251. Id. at 572.
252. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
253. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72.
254. Id. at 572. Justice Kennedy identified as indicators of the emerging awareness the
American Law Institute's 1955 Model Penal Code, the non-enforcement of anti-sodomy
laws, a British Parliament committee's 1957 proposal for the repeal of anti-sodomy crimi-
nal laws, a 1981 decision by the European Court of Human Rights holding that laws
prohibiting consensual sodomy by adults of the same sex violated the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, and the post-Bowers reduction in the number of states prohibiting
sodomy from twenty-five to thirteen states, with four states specifically prohibiting homo-
sexual sodomy. See id. at 572-73.
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when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain
binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is over-
ruled."255 Lawrence and Garner were "entitled to respect for their pri-
vate lives," lives that could not be demeaned by criminalizing their
private sexual behavior under a law furthering "no legitimate state inter-
est which can justify [the state's] intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual." 2 56
Closing his opinion with a decidedly non-traditionalist observation, Jus-
tice Kennedy stated:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As
the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.257
255. Id. at 578.
256. Id. In his dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with the state's argument that a belief that
homosexual sodomy was immoral constituted a legitimate state interest. "State laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, forni-
cation, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation
of laws based on moral choices." Id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "If, as the Court asserts,
the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none
of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review." Id. at 599.
As for Justice Scalia's reference to masturbation, one commentator has noted that "[a]s
there are no laws against masturbation in the United States, and none seem likely to be
adopted in the future, this is one destination on the slippery slope to which we have al-
ready come." Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1154 n.70
(2004); see also Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence's Penumbra, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1175
n.21 (2004) ("Justice Scalia also gets carried away here. Whatever he may think of mastur-
bation, no state has ever criminalized it.").
257. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. Although the petitioners and several amici argued
that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion declined to address that issue: "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if
drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants." Id. at 575. Interestingly, Kennedy reasoned that both "[e]quality of treat-
ment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects" where the criminalization of same-
sex sexual conduct "in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to dis-
crimination both in the public and in the private spheres." Id. As one analyst noted, this
language "sounds almost entirely in equal protection." Post, supra note 142, at 99.
Justice O'Connor, concurring and declining to overrule Bowers, analyzed the case under
the Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579. In her view, the Texas statute
violated the equal protection mandate because the law prohibited same-sex, but not differ-
ent-sex, sodomy. Id. at 581. "That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely
on the participants. Those harmed by this law are people who have a same-sex sexual
orientation and thus are more likely to engage in behavior" proscribed by the law. Id. at
581 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). That differential treatment presented an
issue not before the Court in Bowers: "whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral
disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual
sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy." Id. at 582. She answered that question in the nega-
tive: "Moral disapproval of this group .. . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.; see also id. at 583 (the state's moral
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A vigorous dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, was issued by Justice Scalia. Citing Washington v. Glucksberg,258
he opined that a state may infringe fundamental liberty interests through
means narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests, with
only fundamental rights deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradi-
tions entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.259 Other non-
fundamental liberty interests "may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to
a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." 260 In his view, the right to engage in homosexual sodomy
was not fundamental, and the majority erred in concluding there was no
longstanding tradition of legal proscriptions of such conduct by same-sex
or different-sex couples. 261 Bowers found an established tradition of
"prohibiting sodomy in general," whether performed by same-sex or dif-
ferent-sex couples. 262 It was irrelevant whether the traditional criminal-
ization of sodomy was targeted at homosexuals in particular or at
homosexuals and heterosexuals more generally, he argued, as under ei-
ther view the outlawing of homosexual sodomy sufficed to exclude the
conduct from those rights "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition."263
Justice Scalia also rejected the majority's "emerging awareness" ana-
lytic and focus on the last fifty years.264 An "'emerging awareness' does
not establish a 'fundamental right,"' and anti-sodomy laws have been en-
forced in that fifty-year period.265 "In any event," he continued, "an
'emerging awareness' is by definition not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and traditions,"' and "[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring
into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal
sanctions on certain behavior." 266
Bowers reflected and gave operational effect to a specific formulation
of traditionalism, one found in the common law, the laws of the original
disapproval of homosexual sodomy "proves nothing more than Texas' desire to criminal-
ize" such conduct and "serve[d] more as a statement of dislike and disapproval against
homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior"); see also id. at 599-600 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with Justice O'Connor's equal protection analysis and arguing that
because the Texas law applied to both men and women and to homosexuals and heterosex-
uals, "this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, since it is precisely the same distinc-
tion regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with someone of the
same sex").
258. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see supra notes 45, 90 and accompanying text.
259. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 594.
262. Id. at 596.
263. Id. at 594. It is difficult to square this analysis with Justice Scalia's earlier call for
the identification of a tradition at its most specific level so as to avoid the "imprecise gui-
dance" provided by "general traditions," which allow "judges to dictate rather than discern
the society's views." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989); see supra note
167 and accompanying text.
264. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J. dissenting); see supra note 254 and accompa-
nying text.
265. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
266. Id.
[Vol. 66874
On Substantive Due Process
thirteen states at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791,
the laws of the states at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, and in state-law prohibitions of sodomy circa 1961
and as of the date of the Court's decision in 1986. In the Court's view,
that tradition pointed in one and only one direction-states could
criminalize homosexual sodomy because they had done so in the past-
and any argument to the contrary was not only incorrect, it was "face-
tious." 2 6 7 Lawrence repudiated Bowers's traditionalist analysis.268 The
common law and the laws existing in 1791 and 1868 did not provide an
answer to the twenty-first century challenge to the Texas deviate sexual
intercourse law. The Court looked, instead, to the half-century preceding
its ruling and determined that the earlier traditional views of some re-
garding a state's ability to lawfully criminalize certain same-sex intimate
relationships did not bind later generations, and did not foreclose an ap-
proach to and application of substantive due process principles different
from that taken in Bowers. The ban that was constitutionally permissible
in 1986 was unconstitutional in 2003.
H. McDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO
In District of Columbia v. Heller269 the Supreme Court held that the
Second Amendment to the Constitution270 conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms, and that the District of Columbia's "ban on hand-
gun possession in the home" and "prohibition against rendering any law-
ful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate self-
defense" violated that amendment.271
Thereafter, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois,272 the Court ad-
dressed a similar prohibition.273 The Court asked:
267. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
268. It should be noted that in rejecting Bowers's holding that there was no fundamen-
tal right to engage in homosexual sodomy; Lawrence did not expressly state that the right
to engage in same-sex intimacies was fundamental. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("[N]owhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a
'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a
'fundamental right.'"); RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONsTITUrTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 334 (2004) ("Lawrence is especially noteworthy because it pro-
tects liberty, rather than privacy, without any discussion of whether that liberty [is] 'funda-
mental."'). This salient silence allowed the Court to strike down the challenged Texas
statute without engaging in the fundamentality analysis, which asks whether the state is
pursuing a compelling governmental interest through narrowly tailored means.
269. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
270. See U.S. CONST. amend. 11 (1791) ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.").
271. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
272. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
273. The Chicago law, which required the registration of firearms and prohibited the
registration of most handguns, was also challenged as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id. at 3028; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
(1868) ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States . . . ."). The Court declined to consider that claim
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whether the Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms is
incorporated in the concept of due process. In answering that ques-
tion, . . . we must decide whether the right to keep and bear arms is
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, or . . . whether this
right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 274
Relying on Heller, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. stated that "[s]elf-de-
fense is a basic right, recognized by many legal systems from ancient
times to the present day," and that "individual self-defense is the central
component of the Second Amendment right." 275 Tracing the origins of
the right from the 1689 English Bill of Rights to Blackstone's 1765 asser-
tion that "the right to keep and bear arms was 'one of the fundamental
rights of Englishmen" 276 and to "the American colonists," 277 Alito
opined that the "right to keep and bear arms was considered no less fun-
damental by those who drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights." 278 Follow-
ing the ratification of the Bill of Rights, nine states adopted state
constitutional provisions protecting the individual right to keep and bear
arms between 1789 and 1820, joining four states that "had adopted Sec-
ond Amendment analogues before ratification." 2 7 9
The "right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of
self-defense" in the 1850s,280 and following the Civil War, the efforts of
the 39th Congress "to safeguard the right to keep and bear arms demon-
strate that the right was still recognized to be fundamental." 2 8 1 At that
time "systematic efforts were made to disarm" African Americans who
had served in the Union army and other black persons,282 and "armed
parties, often consisting of ex-Confederate soldiers serving in the state
militias, forcibly took firearms from newly freed slaves." 283 Congress pro-
vided a legislative response to this development in the Freedmen's Bu-
reau Act of 1866:
"the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisi-
tion, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal,
including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and
or to disturb its holding in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). See McDonald,
130 S. Ct. at 3030. But see id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) ("The right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that
applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause.").
274. Id. at 3036 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
275. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 3037.
278. Id. "[T]hose who were fearful that the new Federal Government would infringe
traditional rights such as the right to keep and bear arms insisted on the adoption of the
Bill of Rights as a condition for ratification of the Constitution .... This is surely powerful
evidence that the right was regarded as fundamental in the sense relevant here." Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 3038.
281. Id. at 3040.
282. Id. at 3038.
283. Id. at 3039.
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enjoyed by all the citizens ... without respect to race or color, or
previous condition of slavery. "284
The Civil Rights Act of 1866285 "similarly sought to protect the right of all
citizens to keep and bear arms."
Representative Bingham believed that the Civil Rights Act pro-
tected the same rights as enumerated in the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,
which of course explicitly mentioned the right to keep and bear arms
.... The unavoidable conclusion is that the Civil Rights Act, like the
Freedmen's Bureau Act, aimed to protect "the constitutional right to
bear arms." 2 8 6
Moreover, Justice Alito opined, during the debates on the Fourteenth
Amendment, that "the 39th Congress referred to the right to keep and
bear arms as a fundamental right deserving of protection," and
"[e]vidence from the period immediately following the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment only confirms that the right to keep and bear
arms was considered fundamental." 2 8 7
The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by state
constitutions at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied. In 1868, 22 of the 37 States in the Union had state constitutional
provisions explicitly protecting the right to keep and bear arms.
Quite a few of these state constitutional guarantees, moreover, ex-
plicitly protected the right to keep and bear arms as an individual
right to self-defense. What is more, state constitutions adopted dur-
ing the Reconstruction era by former Confederate States included a
right to keep and bear arms. A clear majority of the States in 1868,
therefore, recognized the right to keep and bear arms as being
among the foundational rights necessary to our system of
Government.
In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty.288
Accordingly, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized by the
Court in Heller.2 8 9
Justice Stevens, dissenting, referenced Justice Cardozo's test set out in
Palko v. Connecticut:2 9 0 "we must ask whether the allegedly unlawful
practice violates values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "291
That test "undeniably requires judges to apply their own reasoned judg-
284. Id. at 3040 (alterations in original) (quoting Freedman's Bureau Act of 1866, 14
Stat. 17, 176-77, 1866).
285. 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
286. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3040-41.
287. Id. at 3041.
288. Id. at 3042 (footnotes and citations omitted).
289. See id. at 3050.
290. 302 U.S. 319 (1937); see supra notes 85 and accompanying text.
291. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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ment" via an analysis grounded in "historical and empirical data of vari-
ous kinds" and with consideration of other "critical variables," such as
"[t]extual commitments laid down elsewhere in the Constitution, judicial
precedents, English common law, legislative and social facts, scientific
and professional developments, practices of other civilized societies, and,
above all else, the traditions and conscience of our people." 2 9 2
Justice Stevens criticized the way Justice Alito's opinion hinged "on
one mode of intellectual history, culling selected pronouncements and en-
actments from the 18th and 19th centuries to ascertain what Americans
thought about firearms." 293 Such a rigid historical test was not appropri-
ate, Stevens contended, as the Court's substantive due process doctrine
"has never evaluated substantive rights in purely, or even predominately,
historical terms," 294 and the answer to the question before the Court
"cannot be found in a granular inspection of state constitutions or con-
gressional debates." 295 In his view, a liberty guarantee recognizing "only
those rights so rooted in our history, tradition, and practice as to require
special protection . . . would serve little function, save to ratify those
rights that state actors have already been according the most extensive
protection. "296
That approach is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans laid
down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level
of generality they chose when they crafted its language; it promises
an objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value judgments that
pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are
sufficiently 'rooted'; it countenances the most revolting injustices in
the name of continuity, for we must never forget that not only slav-
ery but also the subjugation of women and other rank forms of dis-
crimination are part of our history; and it effaces this Court's
distinctive role in saying what the law is, leaving the development
and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes. It is
judicial abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.2 9 7
Justice Stevens did not ask, as did Justice Alito, whether the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms has been incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore applies to the states. 298 "The ques-
tion, rather, is whether the particular right asserted by petitioners applies
to the States because of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, standing on its
own bottom." 299 While he agreed with the Court that its substantive due
process precedents provided a "principled basis for holding that petition-
ers have a constitutional right to possess a usable firearm in the home,"
Stevens concluded that "a better reading of our case law supports the city
292. Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
293. Id. at 3097.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 3098.
296. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id. at 3098-99 (footnote omitted).
298. See supra notes 286-88 and accompanying text.
299. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3103 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of Chicago." 3^  He found no post-Lochner substantive due process case
"that holds, states, or even suggests that the term 'liberty' encompasses
either the common-law right of self-defense or a right to keep and bear
arms."30 And "although it may be true that Americans' interest in fire-
arm possession and state-law recognition of that interest are 'deeply
rooted' in some important senses, it is equally true that the States have a
long and unbroken history of regulating firearms."302
The idea that States may place substantial restrictions on the right to
keep and bear arms short of complete disarmament is, in fact, far
more entrenched than the notion that the Federal Constitution pro-
tects any such right. Federalism is a far older and more deeply rooted
tradition than is a right to carry, or to own, any particular kind of
weapon.303
Furthermore and significantly, Justice Stevens rejected the claim made
by Justice Scalia that traditionalism is "an 'objective,' 'neutral' method of
substantive due process analysis." 304
At what level of generality should one frame the liberty interest in
question? What does it mean for a right to be deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition? By what standard will that proposi-
tion be tested? Which types of sources will count, and how will those
sources be weighed and aggregated? There is no objective, neutral
answer to these questions. There is not even a theory-at least, Jus-
tice Scalia provides none-of how to go about answering them.305
"[H]istory is not an objective science, and . . . its use can therefore
point in any direction the judges favor."306 A judge "canvas[sing] the en-
tire landscape of American law as it has evolved through time, and per-
haps older laws as well" does so "pursuant to a standard (deeply
rootedness) that has never been defined."o307 A judge who has embarked
on "this rudderless, panoramic tour of American legal history . . . has
more than ample opportunity to look over the heads of the crowd and
pick out [his] friends."308 Pointing out that under his approach "the
judge's cards are laid on the table for all to see, and to critique," 309 Ste-
300. Id. at 3107.
301. Id. at 3109.
302. Id. at 3112 (citation omitted).
303. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Id. at 3116; see also id. at 3055 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Deciding what is essential
to an enlightened, liberty-filled life is an inherently political, moral judgment-the antithe-
sis of an objective approach that reaches conclusions by applying neutral rules to verifiable
evidence.").
305. Id. at 3116-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Bartlett, supra note 11, at 545 ("Tradition is not fixed, nor can it be easily or
reliably retrieved. It represents not fixed facts, but accumulated values that cannot be as-
certained through some precise, scientific method.").
306. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3117 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
307. Id.
308. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Id. at 3118.
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vens opined that in "answering a constitutional question to which the text
provides no clear answer, there is always some amount of discretion; our
constitutional system has always depended on judges' filling in the docu-
ment's vast open spaces."310
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor, expressed his concern about "the reefs and shoals that lie in
wait for those nonexpert judges who place virtually determinative weight
upon historical considerations." 3 11 In his view, "the Court should not
look to history alone but to other factors as well . ... It should, for exam-
ple, consider the basic values that underlie a constitutional provision and
their contemporary significance" and "should examine as well the rele-
vant consequences and practical justifications that might, or might not,
warrant removing an important question from the democratic decision-
making process." 312 He argued that
the specific question before us is not whether there are references to
the right to bear arms for self-defense throughout this Nation's his-
tory-of course there are-or even whether the Court should incor-
porate a simple constitutional requirement that firearms regulations
not unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear arms. 313
Rather, the question is "whether there is a consensus that so substantial a
private self-defense right as the one described in Heller applies to the
States." 314 Surveying the historical record,315 he concluded that the "re-
cord is insufficient to say that the right to bear arms for private self-de-
fense . . . is fundamental in the sense relevant to the incorporation
inquiry .... States and localities have consistently enacted firearm regula-
tions . . . throughout our Nation's history. Courts have repeatedly upheld
such regulations." 3 16 Accordingly, Breyer could not "find sufficient his-
torical support for the majority's conclusion that that right is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 3 1 7
During the almost twenty-five years beginning with the Court's deci-
sion in Bowers and ending with its ruling in McDonald, the Court and
individual Justices have employed some form of traditionalism in consid-
ering and resolving substantive due process and fundamental rights
claims. Bowers-style traditionalism resulted in the validation of a state
law criminalizing certain sexual conduct engaged in by persons of the
same sex; the joint opinion in Casey declared that the outer limits of the
substantive sphere of liberty were not marked by the Bill of Rights or
state practices at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; a majority of the Court in Glucksberg did look to and relied on
310. Id.
311. Id. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 3130.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 3131-36.
316. Id. at 3131.
317. Id.
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state practices at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification as
well as other historical and traditional practices and views; a year later,
the Lewis Court applied its non-traditionalist "shock-the-conscience"
precedent; Lawrence, overruling Bowers, formulated and employed yet
another type of traditionalism and proclaimed that tradition is the start-
ing but not the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry; and
McDonald canvassed the nation's history and tradition in finding that the
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right. Discretionary tradi-
tionalism is on display in and is common to all of the foregoing cases as
evidenced by the Justices' differing methodological, interpretive, and
value choices relative to the operative meaning and content of the Due
Process Clauses.
IV. DISCRETIONARY TRADITIONALISM IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
Examples of discretionary traditionalism in cases decided by the fed-
eral courts of appeals provide further evidence of the importance of this
approach to substantive due process analysis and the fundamentality
question. This Part discusses the choices made and the discretion enjoyed
and exercised by judges in cases involving plaintiffs' claims of a constitu-
tionally protected right of access to medical marijuana, experimental
drugs, and sexual devices, and a right to freedom from the individual
mandate provision of the recently enacted federal health care law.
A. ACCESS To MEDICAL MARIJUANA
In Raich v. Gonzales, Angela McClary Raich claimed that she had a
constitutionally protected right to use medical marijuana on the recom-
mendation of her physician.318 Diagnosed with a number of serious medi-
cal conditions,319 Raich contended that she had "a fundamental right to
mak[e] life-shaping medical decisions that are necessary to preserve the
integrity of her body, avoid intolerable physical pain, and preserve her
life." 320
The court did not agree with Raich's framing of the asserted fundamen-
tal right.321 "Conspicuously missing . . . is its centerpiece: that she seeks
the right to use marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid pain, and
preserve her life." 322 Citing, among other cases, Washington v. Gluck-
318. 500 F.3d 850, 864 (9th Cir. 2007). This case was heard by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on remand following the Supreme Court's decision in
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), which held that intrastate cultivation and use of
marijuana may be prohibited by Congress acting under its Commerce Clause power as set
forth in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971.
319. "Raich has been diagnosed with more than ten serious medical conditions, includ-
ing an inoperable brain tumor, a seizure disorder, life-threatening weight loss, nausea, and
several chronic pain disorders." Raich, 500 F.3d at 855.
320. Id. at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted). Raich also presented, and the court
rejected, claims grounded in common-law necessity and the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 869.




sberg323 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,324 the
Ninth Circuit opined that "the right must be carefully stated and narrowly
identified before the ensuing analysis can proceed. Accordingly, we will
add the centerpiece-the use of marijuana-to Raich's proposed
right." 325 The court thus reframed and narrowed the question before it as
"whether the liberty interest specially protected by the Due Process
Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] embraces a right to make a life-shaping
decision on a physician's advice to use medical marijuana to preserve
bodily integrity, avoid intolerable pain, and preserve life, where all other
prescribed medications and remedies have failed." 326
Was the fundamental right as described by the court deeply rooted in
the nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty? No, said the Ninth Circuit. Although there was "considerable evi-
dence that efforts to regulate marijuana use in the early-twentieth-cen-
tury targeted recreational use, but permitted medical use," 3 2 7 by 1965 all
fifty states had criminalized the possession of marijuana with exceptions
in almost every state for individuals using the drug for medicinal pur-
poses. 3 2 8 In the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, Congress prohibited all
uses of marijuana, including medical use, and no state allowed the use of
medical marijuana until California did so in its Compassionate Use Act of
1996.329 While the "mere enactment of a law, state or federal, that pro-
hibits certain behavior does not necessarily mean that the behavior is not
deeply rooted in this country's history and traditions," the court deemed
it "noteworthy ... that over twenty-five years went by [after the enact-
ment of the 1970 federal law] before any state enacted a law to protect
the alleged right."330
Raich relied on the "emerging awareness" analysis set out in Lawrence
v. Texas,331 focusing on the ten years preceding her legal action and con-
tending that that time span had been "characterized by an emerging
awareness of marijuana's medical value." 332 The Ninth Circuit was not
persuaded: "the use of medical marijuana has not obtained the degree of
recognition today that private sexual conduct had obtained by 2004 in
Lawrence."333 Looking to the states, the court noted that since 1996 ten
323. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text.
324. 497 U.S. 261 (1990); see supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
325. Raich, 500 F.3d at 864.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 865.
328. See id.
329. Id.; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2007). "[S]eriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that
medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has
determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treat-
ment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or
any other illness for which marijuana provides relief." HEALTH & SAFETY§ 1132.5(b)(1)(A).
330. Raich, 500 F.3d at 865 n.14.
331. 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003); see supra notes 237-68 and accompanying text.
332. Raich, 500 F.3d at 865.
333. Id.
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states had decriminalized certain uses of marijuana by seriously ill per-
sons; other states recognized that the drug could have therapeutic value,
while other states permitted the use of marijuana in experimental treat-
ment programs.334 Agreeing "that medical and conventional wisdom that
recognizes the use of marijuana for medical purposes is gaining traction
in the law as well," the court concluded that such "legal recognition has
not yet reached the point where a conclusion can be drawn that the right
to use medical marijuana is 'fundamental' and 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'"335 Thus, "[f]or the time being, this issue remains in the
arena of public debate and legislative action."336
B. ACCESS To EXPERIMENTAL DRUGS
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Es-
chenbach337 answered in the negative the following question (as framed
by the plaintiff):
Whether the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause embraces
the right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining approved treat-
ment options to decide, in consultation with his or her own doctor,
whether to seek access to investigational medications that the [Food
and Drug Administration] concedes are safe and promising enough
for substantial human testing.338
Assuming arguendo that the foregoing description of the asserted right
satisfied Glucksberg's "careful description" requirement,339 the court (in
an opinion authored by Judge Thomas B. Griffith) rejected the argument
that the right could be found in the nation's history and legal traditions
because the federal government had "never interfered with the judgment
of individual doctors about the medical efficacy of particular drugs until
1962."340 That "focus on efficacy regulation ignores one simple fact: it is
unlawful for the Alliance to procure experimental drugs not only because
they have not been proven effective, but because they have not been
proven safe." 341 "Thus, to succeed on its claim of a fundamental right of
access for the terminally ill to experimental drugs, the Alliance must
show not only that there is a tradition of access to drugs that have not yet
been proven effective, but also a tradition of access to drugs that have not
334. See id. at 865-66.
335. Id. at 866 (citation omitted).
336. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ("For now, federal
law is blind to the wisdom of a future day when the right to use medical marijuana to
alleviate excruciating pain may be deemed fundamental. Although that day has not yet
dawned, considering that during the last ten years eleven states have legalized the use of
medical marijuana, that day may be upon us sooner than expected.").
337. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
338. Id. at 701 (citing Appellants' Brief at 1).
339. Id. at 702; see supra note 219 and accompanying text.
340. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703.
341. Id. "Although the Alliance contends that it only wants drugs that 'are safe and
promising enough for substantial human testing' . . . current law bans access to an experi-
mental drug on safety grounds until it has successfully completed all phases of testing." Id.
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yet been proven safe."342
Citing Glucksberg, the court concluded that "our Nation has long ex-
pressed interest in drug regulation, calibrating its response in terms of the
capabilities to determine the risks associated with both drug safety and
efficacy." 343 The regulation of drugs in the United States began in the
colonies and states with Virginia's passage of a 1736 law, followed by an
1808 act passed in the territory of Orleans (Louisiana), an 1817 South
Carolina law requiring the licensing of pharmacists, and laws in Georgia
and Alabama passed in 1825 and 1852, respectively. 344
By 1870, at least twenty-five states or territories had statutes regulat-
ing adulteration (impure drugs), and a few others had laws address-
ing poisons. In the early history of our Nation, we observe not a
tradition of protecting a right of access to drugs, but rather govern-
ments responding to the risks of new compounds as they become
aware of and able to address those risks.345
As for federal regulation, 346 the court noted the Import Drug Act of
1848; the Biologics Controls Act of 1902; the Pure Food and Drugs Act of
1906; the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA); and the 1962
amendments to the FDCA in which "Congress amended the FDCA ... to
explicitly require that the [Food and Drug Administration] only approve
drugs deemed effective for public use." 347
The defendant FDA, relying on Lawrence v. Texas, urged that the
"'history of the FDCA over the past seventy years is entitled to particular
weight in the substantive due process calculus." 348 The court determined
that it did not have to decide "whether recent history [was] particularly
relevant in measuring the scope of rights under the Due Process
Clause . . . [because] there [was] no evidence of a deeply rooted right of
terminally ill patients to gain access to experimental drugs-either
throughout our Nation's history or during the past half century." 349 Fur-
thermore, the court continued, the Alliance's argument that a drug's ef-
fectiveness was not required before 1962 did not withstand scrutiny.350
"[A]t least some drug regulation prior to 1962 addressed efficacy" 351 and
"an arguably limited history of efficacy prior to 1962 does not establish a
fundamental right of access to unproven drugs" because "amendments
made to the FDCA by Congress throughout the twentieth century
demonstrate that Congress and the FDA have continually responded to
new risks presented by an evolving technology." 3 5 2 The court recognized
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See id. at 704.
345. Id.
346. See id. at 704-05.
347. Id. at 705.
348. Id. at 705 n.10. (quoting Appellee's Brief at 31).
349. Id.
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that "a lack of government interference throughout history might be
some evidence that a right is deeply rooted. But standing alone, it cannot
be enough." 353 If the absence of such interference established a deeply
rooted tradition, it could be argued that marijuana use, the use of narcot-
ics, and the freedom to drive a car as fast as one pleases would be funda-
mental rights.354 "But this is most certainly not the law. A prior lack of
regulation suggests that we must exercise care in evaluating the untested
assertion of a constitutional right to be free from new regulation."3 55
A dissenting Judge Judith W. Rogers, joined by then Chief Judge
Douglas H. Ginsburg, did not agree with the court's framing of the issue
for decision. She noted that "the description of the right is of crucial im-
portance-too broad and a right becomes all-encompassing and impossi-
ble to evaluate; too narrow and a right appears trivial." 356 She did not
ask, as did the majority, whether the Due Process Clause embraced a
terminally ill patient's right to seek access to investigational medications
that the FDA concedes are safe and promising.357 Rather, Rogers asked
whether a terminally ill patient has the right "to save her own life,"35 a
right "deprived without due process of law when the FDA makes it prac-
tically impossible for Alliance members for whom conventional treat-
ments have failed to access investigational new drugs that have been
approved for substantial human testing."359 That claimed right has a "tex-
tual anchor" in the Due Process Clause's "right to life." 36 0
Judge Rogers determined that the right of a person to attempt to pre-
serve her life can be found in the nation's history and tradition. In her
view, "this Nation has long entrusted in individuals those fundamentally
personal medical decisions that lie at the core of personal autonomy, self-
determination, and self-defense." 36 1 The claimed right predates the
founding of the United States;362 was recognized in the common law right
of self-defense, necessity, and protection against interference with res-
cue;3 6 3 and can be located in "a sizable body" of Supreme Court case law
353. Id.
354. Id. at 707.
355. Id. Having concluded that the Alliance's claimed right was not fundamental, the
court subjected the claim to rational basis scrutiny and the Alliance was required to prove
that the governmental restrictions bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state inter-
est. The court held that "the FDA's policy of limiting access to investigational drugs is
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting patients, including the termi-
nally ill, from potentially unsafe drugs with unknown therapeutic effects." Id. at 713.
356. Id. at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
357. See id. at 701 (majority opinion).
358. Id. at 714 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 715.
360. Id. at 727.
361. Id. at 717. See generally, Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experi-
mental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).
362. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 717.
363. See id. at 717-19. Regarding the common law right of self-defense, Judge Rogers
opined that "[although the concept of self-defense is most often thought of in terms of the
response to an assault by another human being, its premise compels the same response in
the face of other forms of aggression against life and limb, whether the aggressor be an
animal or a diseased cell within one's body." Id. at 717-18.
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"regarding the right to a potentially life-saving medical procedure when
the life or health of a pregnant woman is on the line." 3  Given this his-
torical record and backdrop, Rogers reasoned that it was not coincidental
that neither the majority nor the FDA could point to evidence from the
nation's early history demonstrating governmental restraint of the termi-
nally ill seeking to access medical treatments and procedures of unknown
efficacy that had not been proven to be unsafe. 365
As for the majority's opinion that the lack of government interference
throughout history was not enough to demonstrate that a right was
deeply rooted,366 Judge Rogers set forth three reasons supporting her
conclusion that the court's position was misguided.
First, the most fundamental rights are those that no government of
the people would contemplate abridging-it is doubtful that many
courts or legislatures have discussed whether the government can de-
termine whether we are allowed to breathe air, but this does not
make our access to oxygen any less grounded in history. 367
Second, in Glucksberg "the Supreme Court did not say ... that a right
can be fundamental only if it has been acknowledged by statute or deci-
sional law." 36 8 Finally, any concern that a deeply rooted right established
by the absence of government interference would result in sweeping
claims of fundamental rights neglects the second Glucksberg requirement
that the right be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.3 6 9
Turning to the ordered liberty criterion, Judge Rogers noted that the
Supreme Court has declared that this requirement "'encompasses and
protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, moth-
erhood, procreation, and child rearing," 370 as well as other rights and
freedoms. The right claimed by the Alliance "also falls squarely within
the realm of rights implicit in ordered liberty. The core of liberty is auton-
omy .... It is difficult to imagine any context in which this liberty interest
would be stronger than in trying to save one's own life."37' The govern-
ment is not being asked to provide treatment or a subsidy; it is being
asked to "step aside" and not interfere with the terminally ill patient's
right of self-determination. 372 Denying that right with no strict showing of
governmental necessity is paternalistic and "is directly at odds with this
Nation's history and traditions giving recognition to individual self-deter-
mination and autonomy where one's own life is at stake and should ex-
364. Id. at 719.
365. See id. at 722.
366. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
367. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 722 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
368. Id.; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) ("[Historical] protection need not take the form of an explicit constitutional provision
or statutory guarantee, but it must at least exclude ... a societal tradition of enacting laws
denying the interest.").
369. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 723 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 727 (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973)).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 728.
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tend no further than the result in this case." 373
C. SEXUAL DEVICES
Now consider substantive due process challenges to state prohibitions
of the sale and distribution of sexual devices.
In Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama,374 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered a challenge to an
Alabama law prohibiting the commercial distribution of "any device de-
signed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human geni-
tal organs for any thing of pecuniary value."375 Rejecting the American
Civil Liberties Union's invocation of "privacy" and "personal autonomy"
as matters protected under the concept of substantive due process ("there
is no fundamental right to either"), 3 7 6 and declining to extrapolate a right
to sexual privacy from "scattered dicta"377 in Lawrence v. Texas,378 the
court applied the two-step Glucksberg analysis: (1) a careful description
of the asserted right and (2) determining whether the carefully described
asserted right is a fundamental right that is deeply rooted in the nation's
history and tradition, and is "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.'" 3 7 9
Regarding step one, the district court had characterized the claimed
right as "a fundamental right to sexual privacy between married persons
and between unmarried persons which, in turn, encompasses a right to
use sexual devices." 380 The Eleventh Circuit determined that this formu-
lation of the right "potentially encompasses a great universe of sexual
activities, including many that historically have been, and continue to be,
prohibited"38 such as adult incest, obscenity, and prostitution.382 Nar-
rowing the inquiry, the appeals court asked whether the Constitution pro-
tects the right to use sexual devices when engaging in lawful, private
sexual activity.383
Continuing to step two of the Glucksberg analysis, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the record before it did not show that the right as framed
373. Id.
374. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
375. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2 (2006).
376. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1235.
377. Id. at 1236.
378. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
379. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997)); see also Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479,
1488-93 (2008) (discussing the Glucksberg two-step analysis).
380. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (quotation marks
omitted), rev'd, Williams, 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004). The district court limited the
claimed right to consenting adults. See id. at 1292.
381. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1239-40.
382. See id. at 1240.
383. See id. at 1242. The court also criticized and rejected the district court's focus on
contemporary practices and emphasis on contemporary trends of legislative and social lib-
eralization of attitudes toward adults' consensual sexual activities. See id. at 1243. But see
id. at 1258 (Barkett, J., dissenting) ("Lawrence looked to modern trends and practices.").
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by the court was a deeply rooted one; that record did suggest, however,
that "sex toys historically have attracted the attention of the law . .. in the
context of proscription, not protection." 3 8 4 For example, the Comstock
Act of 1873385 prohibited the importation and use of the mails for trans-
porting "every article or thing intended or adapted for any indecent or
immoral use." 386 In addition, the sale of such articles was prohibited by
several states in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 387 The existence of such
laws "undermines the argument that sexual devices historically have been
free from state interference." 38 8 The court also considered the district
court's observation that the Comstock Act and federal case reporters did
not specifically refer to dildos and vibrators.389 The absence of statutory
references to particular sexual devices "is relatively meaningless without
evidence that commerce in these devices was sufficiently widespread, or
sufficiently in the public eye, to merit legislative attention, at least beyond
general anti-obscenity laws."390 And the argument based on the absence
of references to certain devices in federal case reporters unjustifiably as-
sumed "that reported cases are reliable proxies for actual prosecutions,
the vast majority of which would have never appeared in the court re-
porters" and "overlooks the possibility of prosecutions under state
law."391
In dissent, Judge Rosemary Barkett argued that the case was not about
sex or sexual devices, but "the tradition of American citizens from the
inception of our democracy to value the constitutionally protected right
to be left alone in the privacy of their bedrooms and personal relation-
ships." 392 Applying the analytical framework of the Court's post-Gluck-
sberg decision in Lawrence, Barkett stated that "the proper inquiry is
simply whether adults have a right to engage in private sexual conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 393 The Lawrence Court's affirmative answer to that
question was not, as the majority suggested, "scattered dicta," but was a
"direct response to the question it granted certiorari to answer and that it
found was necessary to resolve before disposing of the case." 394
In Judge Barkett's view, the Williams majority erroneously reduced
and limited the claimed liberty interest to a specific sexual act, "asking
not whether consenting adults have a right to sexual privacy, but whether
an Alabama citizen has the right to use sex toys." 3 9 5 That narrow framing
384. Id. at 1245.
385. 17 Stat. 599 (1873).
386. United States v. Chase, 135 U.S. 255, 257 (1890).
387. See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1245 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 1325 (1902); MASS.





392. Id. at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
393. Id. at 1255.
394. Id. at 1256.
395. Id. at 1257.
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of the at-issue right "severely discounts the extent of the liberty at stake
in this case," because the law goes beyond restricting the sale of particu-
lar sexual devices and burdens the private sexual activity of adults within
their homes. 396 Furthermore, the majority's use of history and its reading
of Glucksberg was flawed. Judge Barkett accused the majority of in-
venting "the requirement that there must be a history of affirmative legis-
lative protection before a right can be judicially protected"; that
requirement "redefin[es] the doctrine of substantive due process to pro-
tect only those rights that are already explicitly protected by law."39 7 The
affirmative-governmental-protection requirement would have resulted in
a different outcome in Roe v. Wade as "there was no lengthy tradition of
protecting abortion and the use of contraceptives, yet both were found to
be protected by a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause."398
A different result was reached in Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle.3 9 9
Texas law prohibited the promotion of "obscene devices" "designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital or-
gans," with a violation of the statute resulting in imprisonment for up to
two years. 400 The plaintiffs, operators of retail stores carrying sexual de-
vices, claimed "that the right at stake is the individual's substantive due
process right to engage in private intimate conduct free from government
intrusion." 401 The defendant-state proposed a different right: "the right to
stimulate one's genitals for non-medical purposes unrelated to procrea-
tion or outside of an interpersonal relationship." 4 0 2
Guided by Lawrence,403 a majority of the three-member panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion au-
thored by Judge Reavley, described the issue as "whether the Texas stat-
ute impermissibly burdens the individual's substantive due process right
to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing." 404 Texas's
law heavily burdened that constitutional right, the court concluded, be-
cause an individual who desires to lawfully "use a safe sexual device dur-
ing private intimate moments alone or with another is unable to legally
purchase a device in Texas." 405 The court explained:
Just as in Lawrence, the State here wants to use its laws to enforce a
public moral code by restricting private intimate conduct. The case is
not about public sex. It is not about controlling commerce in sex. It is
about controlling what people do in the privacy of their own homes
because the State is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1258.
398. Id.
399. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
400. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21(a)(5)-(7), 43.23(a), (d). The statute did not pro-
hibit the use or possession of such devices. See Reliable, 517 F.3d at 741.
401. Reliable, 517 F.3d at 743.
402. Id.
403. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see supra notes 237-68.




private intimate conduct. This is an insufficient justification for the
statute after Lawrence.406
D. REFUSING UNWANTED MEDICAL CARE
Recently, a constitutional challenge to the individual mandate provi-
sion of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was before the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in U.S. Citizens As-
sociation v. Sebelius.407 The challengers argued, inter alia, that the indi-
vidual mandate violated their right "to be let alone, including the right to
make choices not to receive medical treatment of a particular kind or at
all; not to pay for unwanted treatments or pay for insurance that covers
unwanted treatments; and not to divulge medical confidences to a private
insurer or its agents in order to obtain health insurance." 408
Rejecting that contention, the court concluded that the individual man-
date did not implicate the claimed fundamental liberty right, as the plain-
tiffs were "free to choose their medical providers" as well as the medical
treatments they would or would not accept. 409 Citing Glucksberg, the
court reasoned that "[r]egardless of whether plaintiffs' claim is cast as a
freedom to remain uninsured or a freedom to refuse to pay for unwanted
medical care, the right asserted cannot be characterized as 'fundamental'
so as to receive heightened protection under the Due Process Clause." 410
V. CONCLUSION
The observation that constitutional law is "largely the result of discre-
tionary judgments made by judges" 411 is especially true where plaintiffs
invoke the substantive component of the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution as the source of a claimed fundamental right. As discussed
in the preceding pages, judges' discretionary and subjective judgments
can be critical to analysis of and the outcomes in substantive due process
cases where tradition and traditionalism are made part of the adjudicative
calculus.
Is traditionalism the appropriate or preferred methodology? How is
the applicable level of generality selected and framed? What is-or is
406. Id. at 746. Judge Barksdale dissented from the court's substantive-due-process
analysis and invalidation of the statute. In her view, Lawrence invalidated laws that
targeted both private and non-commercial conduct and not the public and commercial con-
duct regulated by the Texas statute. See id. at 749 (Barksdale, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 538 F.3d 355, 361 (5th Cir.
2008) (Jones, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing, inter alia, that
the court failed to apply the two-step Glucksberg analysis).
407. 705 F.3d 588 (6th Cir. 2013). The individual mandate "requires each individual to
purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage or make a
shared responsibility payment." Id. at 592.
408. Id. at 601.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM N. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 27
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there always a discernible-relevant history and tradition, and how does
one "objectively" identify and determine that such history and tradition
are "deeply rooted"? How does one even objectively define the deeply
rootedness standard? 412 These and other queries have been asked and
answered in varying ways by users of and participants in the debate over
traditionalist methodology in ways that belie the notion that this ap-
proach provides neutral rules for-and an objective approach to-the
resolution of fundamentality issues. Rather, judicial discretion and sub-
jectivity and reasoned judgment have played and continue to play a sig-
nificant role in the interpretation and application of the Due Process
Clauses and the judicial determination that a claimed right is or is not a
"liberty" and fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Recogni-
tion of that reality is essential to an informed understanding of the
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence.
412. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3116 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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